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Abstract: As contemporary society has increasingly recognized the independent rights of 
children, the acceptability of parental corporal punishment has been increasingly 
questioned. I argue that in light of modern research on the negative effects of corporal 
punishment, the New York law that sanctions parental corporal punishment is 
unconstitutional. In order to make this argument, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Eighth Amendment protection against “cruel and unusual punishment” is analyzed. 
Factors used by the Court to determine whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” are 
assessed in relation to corporal punishment.  
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Introduction 
 In 2008 the Supreme Court of Minnesota heard a case involving parental use of corporal 
punishment in the home. The twelve year old boy, G.F., had been leaving home without 
permission “numerous times” and refused to tell his parents the truth about where he had been 
going (In Re: The Welfare of the Children of N.F. and S.F.). The parents had attempted to 
correct G.F.’s behavior by taking away certain privileges and grounding the boy. When these 
methods failed to correct the behavior, the parents told G.F. that if he were to leave the home 
without permission again “he would be paddled once for each year of his age” (In Re: The 
Welfare of the Children of N.F. and S.F.).  
 Despite the threat, G.F. again left the house when he was instructed to go to bed. Upon 
returning fifteen to thirty minutes later, his father used “a small maple paddle” to strike the back 
of G.F.’s upper thighs “approximately twelve times with moderate force” (In Re: The Welfare of 
the Children of N.F. and S.F.). The imposed punishment caused G.F. to have “a temper tantrum” 
and the father responded with force, paddling G.F. again on the upper thighs twelve times with 
moderate force “for being disrespectful” (In Re: The Welfare of the Children of N.F. and S.F.). 
After this round of punishment, G.F. grabbed a knife and threatened to commit suicide, however, 
the father disarmed G.F. and paddled him an additional twelve times with moderate force (In Re: 
The Welfare of the Children of N.F. and S.F.). G.F. was then instructed to go to bed; however, he 
left the house once again without permission through his bedroom window and was found later 
that night walking on the street by the police (In Re: The Welfare of the Children of N.F. and 
S.F.). The Supreme Court of Minnesota found the parents not guilty of any illegal conduct, as the 
punishment of G.F. was not found severe enough to constitute child abuse (In Re: The Welfare 
of the Children of N.F. and S.F.).  
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 G.F. is not alone in his experience of corporal punishment. A nationally representative 
survey of 1,000 parents of children ages one and two in the United States, published in 2004, 
found that 63% of the parents had used physical punishment (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007). A 
second smaller study published in 2007 found that 65% of parents in the United States with 
children ages one and two had used corporal punishment against their child (Gershoff & 
Bitensky, 2007). The number of children who have been corporally punished only rises as they 
increase in age. A 2003 study following 21,000 children found that by the time they reached fifth 
grade, 80% had been corporally punished by their parents at some point (Gershoff & Bitensky, 
2007).  
 This thesis will analyze the constitutionality of corporal punishment of children by their 
parents. Corporal punishment of minors has been an accepted right of parents since the founding 
of this nation and can be traced back to the beginning of civilization, however, an evolving 
understanding of children as distinct people, worthy of the same minimal human rights as adults, 
has caused other nations to question the legitimacy of the ancient practice and the same must be 
done in the United States. The evolving standards of moral decency regarding children’s 
fundamental rights, coupled with modern research about the effectiveness of corporal 
punishment and the negative side effects result in a significant conclusion. Laws sanctioning 
domestic corporal punishment violate the Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause of the United States Constitution. 
 While the majority of the arguments within this paper deal with the United States 
Constitution and therefore are applicable to the 49 states that permit “reasonable” corporal 
punishment, this thesis will argue specifically that the law permitting corporal punishment in 
New York State is unconstitutional. The New York Statute under attack is listed as a defense 
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against criminal liability in the state penal code, stating “The use of physical force upon another 
person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of  
the following circumstances: 1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and 
supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one or an incompetent person, and a teacher or 
other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one for 
a special purpose, may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when 
and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the 
welfare of such person” (§ 35.10). This law directly permits parents to use violence that is not 
excessive against their children. Children therefore are not protected against physical injury in an 
equal manner with the rest of the state population.  
 The law violates the Eighth Amendment which states “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” (U.S. Const. 
amend. VIII). Corporal Punishment of prisoners has already been deemed “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” and the fact that the same punishment is legally applied to children when 
considered overly cruel for criminals convicted of felonies makes little sense. The only United 
States Supreme Court case that has dealt directly with corporal punishment of children was 
Ingraham v. Wright in 1977. This case dealt with the legality of corporal punishment as a method 
of discipline in schools, and while the ability for a teacher to corporally punish students was 
upheld, the Eighth Amendment was found to be inapplicable since it has traditionally only dealt 
with criminal statutes (Ingraham v. Wright, at 664). This argument would not preclude the 
Amendment’s prohibition of domestic corporal punishment in New York where the law 
sanctioning corporal punishment is listed in the state’s penal code as a justification, and thus 
pertains to criminal statutes. 
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Beneficial Societal Impact 
 In addition to these legal arguments, banning corporal punishment would have a 
beneficial effect to society. In a large analysis of previous studies on the effects of corporal 
punishment published in 2002, Elizabeth Gershoff found that moderate corporal punishment was 
linked to decreased moral internalization, mental health, and parent-child relationship, with 
increased aggression, delinquent behavior, antisocial behavior, risk of child abuse, and risk of 
abusing one’s own spouse and children (Gershoff, 2002, p. 544) Corporal punishment has been 
linked to increased rate of depression and suicide (Straus, 1994, p. 77). Furthermore, corporal 
punishment of children who later graduated with a college degree has been correlated with lower 
levels of occupational success and a lower income (Straus, 1994, p. 144).  These effects take root 
during childhood and last into adulthood, resulting in greater societal problems that could be 
potentially decreased by prohibiting corporal punishment, as occurred in Sweden, the first 
country to pass a law against any form of corporal punishment against minors in 1979.  
 A 1999 Swedish study of the generation brought up while corporal punishment was 
illegal found a decrease in compulsory measures of social work intervention, meaning that 
despite new laws preventing parents from violently punishing their children, less children 
required forced intervention for their safety on behalf of the state (Durrant, 1999, p. 6). This 
effect was probably due to the significant reduction in corporal punishment rates subsequent to 
the ban. As parents realized that any violence against their children was not tolerated, they 
moved to alternate means of punishment.  
 The overall rate of crime committed by youth in Sweden subsequent the ban was found 
to remain stable, however, theft by children between ages 15 and 17 declined by 21% between 
1975 and 1996 (Durrant, 1999, p. 6). The proportion narcotics crime suspects within the same 
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age group decreased by 75% percent between 1970 and 1996 (Durrant, 1999, p. 6). Overall 
usage of both alcohol and drugs by minors decreased after the ban, as did the rate of suicide 
(Durrant, 1999, p. 6). Cases of assault against young children by those in the age group 15-19 
also decreased in the decade between 1984 and 1994 (Durrant, 1999, p. 6).  
 Many factors contribute to crime rate, drug usage, alcohol usage, and suicide rate, yet 
with the large amount of research that has determined corporal punishment to be correlated to 
increased personal traits that would contribute to alcohol usage, drug usage, and crime, coupled 
the findings of this Swedish study that compared a generation reared without corporal 
punishment against generations with corporal punishment, suggests that banning corporal 
punishment could be the cause. If so, banning corporal punishment would have similar positive 
societal effects everywhere.  
Legislation v. Court Order  
 The Swedish method of banning corporal punishment through a legislative declaration 
with no specific punishment is no doubt the best means to make the transition. The legislative 
declaration was able to demonstrate to parents that the state disapproved of any use of violence 
against children, while not significantly hurting families where parents were found to corporally 
punish their children. When the Swedish law was passed, a public education campaign took 
place in order to inform the public both of the existence of the new law as well as the law’s 
objectives (Durrant, 1999, p. 7). During this campaign, the Ministry of Justice carried out a 
highly expensive pamphlet distribution, providing a pamphlet to each Swedish household that 
had young children. The pamphlet contained information on the law as well as alternative 
disciplinary strategies that could be used in the event that a child misbehaved (Durrant, 1999, p. 
8). During the two months following the ban, information about the law was also placed on milk 
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cartons, where it was hoped that the ban would become a topic of discussion at mealtime 
(Durrant, 1999, p. 8).   
 If the New York statute permitting corporal punishment was declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, there would be no public education campaign 
organized by the state. In addition, the law providing that corporal punishment is a proper 
justification for otherwise criminal behavior would be revoked, therefore, unlike in Sweden, 
there would be potential punishment for using violence against a child. The New York statute 
providing for third degree assault, which states “A person is guilty of assault in the third degree 
when: 1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such 
person or to a third person; or 2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person” would 
potentially apply to parents who corporally punish their child (Penal Law § 120.00). 
 Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor in New York, meaning that those 
found guilty of the offense can theoretically face up to a year in prison. This would be a major 
objection for those arguing in favor of the current New York statute; however, there are means to 
avoid the problem. Just as the goal of the ban on corporal punishment in Sweden was to educate 
parents on corporal punishment and alternate means, ultimately with the hope of decreasing 
corporal punishment usage, increasing child safety, and allowing for earlier yet less coercive 
intervention by the state, the same would be the goal of banning corporal punishment in New 
York. The fact that a year in prison is the maximum sentence does not mean that it is the likely 
sentence. Through the plea bargaining process, the result of any prosecuted case of corporal 
punishment would most likely be a small fine.  
 Despite the fact that Sweden’s law carries no specific punishment and is primarily a 
declaration, Sweden can, and has prosecuted citizens for violating the prohibition on violence 
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against minors. The reason that the majority of cases in Sweden have not been prosecuted is not 
due to lack of authority, but due to selective enforcement. The fact that a law exists does not 
mean that law enforcement resources need to be spent investigating crimes, nor does it mean that 
charges need to be pressed. A law simply allows for the prosecution of crimes under special 
circumstances or more significant incidents. Thus, the fact that a court opinion ruling the New 
York statute permitting corporal punishment would result in corporal punishment existing as a 
punishable offense does not mean that families would be torn apart with parents sent to prison 
and children sent to foster homes.  
 As in Sweden, rather than greater family separation, the opposite would occur. Many 
children today are taken out of the custody of their legal guardians when the guardian oversteps 
the legitimate authority they have in child rearing. Although corporal punishment is legal in New 
York State, child abuse is not. An abused child as defined in part by the New York Family Court 
Act is “a child less than eighteen years of age whose parent or other person legally responsible 
for his care (i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other than 
accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted 
disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily organ” (Family Court Act § 1012). Also illegal in New 
York, a neglected child, among other things, is defined as a child less than eighteen years of age 
whose parent or legal guardian has inflicted or allowed to be inflicted “excessive corporal 
punishment” (Family Court Act § 1012). Children throughout the state are taken from their 
homes because parents have committed these atrocities against their children.  
 Parents who have committed these acts against their children have surely lost the right 
to rear the children; however, banning corporal punishment will allow social workers and child 
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protective services to intervene at an earlier stage, thus preventing some of the child neglect and 
abuse that would otherwise be permitted to occur. The Swedish hoped that the ban on corporal 
punishment would similarly “encourage earlier intervention in cases of children at risk in order 
to make child welfare work more proactive and less reactive” (Durrant, 1999, p. 18). Likewise in 
New York, banning corporal punishment in the home would allow social workers to legally 
intervene earlier, but intervene in a way to correct the familial relationship before it has become 
uncorrectable. Thus, despite concerns that the family unit will be at risk subsequent a ban on 
corporal punishment, the reality is that a lower rate of families will be broken apart, leaving 
those together more healthy and respectful.         
 The educational campaign that was achieved in Sweden following the ban would surely 
be less effective with a court opinion than if a law were to be passed by the state’s legislature. 
Other researchers have agreed that a legislative declaration like that done in Sweden would be 
the optimal means to prohibit corporal punishment (Shmueli, 2010, p. 319). The difficulty of 
passing such a law through today’s state legislature makes this method unlikely in the near 
future.  
 The rate of parents who used corporal punishment and the frequency that corporal 
punishment was used declined in the decade between 1975 and 1985, and can be expected to 
have continued dropping as the negative effects of corporal punishment become more known 
(Straus, 1994, p. 28-29). Nevertheless, corporal punishment continues to be a commonly used 
means of punishment passed down from generation to generation, therefore, the significant 
political capital that would be consumed in any successful bill would most likely deter a majority 
of the legislative representatives. As more and more foreign countries ban corporal punishment 
in the home, and as more citizens become aware of the negative side effects of corporal 
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punishment, it is likely that over time a legislative bill could be passed, however, until that date, 
children’s rights are being infringed, and terrible long term effects are resulting from corporal 
punishment. Thus, for reasons of expediency it is necessary to achieve corporal punishment 
prohibition through a court decision. 
Defining Corporal Punishment 
 Before proceeding further into the arguments of this thesis, a definition of corporal 
punishment must be established. The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides a very simple 
definition encompassing what many understand corporal punishment against minors to entail, 
defining the action as “punishment administered by an adult (as a parent or teacher) to the body 
of a child ranging in severity from a slap to a spanking” (Corporal Punishment). Slapping and 
spanking are the most common forms of corporal punishment in western culture but they are not 
the exclusive means of corporal punishment.  
 Murray Straus adopted a definition of corporal punishment that was preferable for 
research relating to corporal punishment. The definition, later adopted by Gershoff in her meta-
analysis of corporal punishment research, is “the use of physical force with the intention of 
causing a child to experience pain, but not injury, for the purpose of correction or control of the 
child’s behavior” (Straus, 1994, p. 4). This definition is more inclusive of any type of physical 
force against a child, so long as it is for the purpose of punishment and does not injure the child. 
The fact that corporal punishment is not any use of violence, but only violence used for the 
purpose of correcting and controlling the child’s behavior is crucial. This definition is also 
significant in that the infliction of injury is excluded from the definition. Corporal punishment 
traditionally has included any form of physical violence for the purpose of punishment, however, 
this fact allowed for critics of the conclusions made by modern research on corporal punishment 
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to claim that moderate corporal punishment is not associated with negative side effects. Such 
critics have claimed that the high intensity end of the violence spectrum alone causes negative 
side effects. In using this definition, Straus, Gershoff, and other researchers were able to 
eliminate the upper end of the violence spectrum. They distinguished physical force that caused 
injury as child abuse, thus allowing for research to clearly demonstrate the negative side effects 
of moderate corporal punishment. For this reason, the majority of the research on negative 
behavioral traits linked to corporal punishment which are cited in this thesis utilize the above 
definition. 
  A neglected child as defined by New York State includes a child who has received 
“excessive corporal punishment” (Family Court Act § 1012). Thus excessive corporal 
punishment is already illegal in New York. This thesis will make an argument that any form of 
corporal punishment is unconstitutional, including light, moderate, and infrequent corporal 
punishment. 
Parental Rights v. Rights of Minors 
 A major argument for those who support a parent’s ability to corporally punish their 
children is the historical acceptance that parents can rear their child in the manner that they feel 
is in the best interest of the child. Those claiming that a ban on corporal punishment is 
unconstitutional based on the infringement of a parents right to child rearing certainly have 
significant evidence to support their claim. For example, the United States Supreme Court in 
Troxel v. Granville, a case dealing with a parent’s authority to control visitation rights to the 
child, cited Quilloin v. Walcott, which stated “The history and culture of Western civilization 
reflects a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. 
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond 
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debate as an enduring American tradition” (Troxel v. Granville, at 66). Citing Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, a 1925 Supreme Court case dealing with the right of a parent to choose whether to 
send their children to either private or public school, the Supreme Court in 1944 stated that “It is 
cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor 
hinder” (Prince v. Massachusetts, at 166). 
 Prince v. Massachusetts also cites the court’s 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska 
where it was ruled that children had the right to be taught languages aside from “the nation’s 
common tongue” as a case of parental right to child rearing (Prince v. Massachusetts, at 166). It 
is in regard to those decisions that the court claimed that it had historically “respected the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter” (Prince v. Massachusetts, at 166). Indeed, 
taken out of context, cases such as this one could potentially make a compelling argument that 
the right of a parent to rear their child is one that is protected by the right to privacy interpreted 
through the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Yet in reading on through 
Prince v. Massachusetts, the court wrote “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public 
interest” and then stated “nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation” (Prince v. 
Massachusetts, at 166). The court found that the state in its capacity as parens patriae could act 
“to guard the general interest in youth’s well being” and could “restrict the parent’s control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways” 
(Prince v. Massachusetts, at 166).  
 Prince v. Massachusetts may have proclaimed the ability for state interference in 
familial life; however, the court ruled that the state could not prevent children from engaging in 
preaching work on the sidewalk, as it infringed upon the religious freedom of the parent (Prince 
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v. Massachusetts, at 162). The court held that if a law infringes upon religious freedom, it is 
unconstitutional unless “necessary for or conducive to the child’s protection against some clear 
and present danger” (Prince v. Massachusetts, at 167). While these court cases are far from the 
only one’s dealing with a parent’s right to rear their children and educate them, the cases cited by 
those who claim parents have the right to rear their children as they see fit each have something 
in common. The child in each of these cases has not been in danger, nor have the child’s 
fundamental rights been infringed upon. Parents have a valuable role in the upbringing of youth, 
and the court has protected that right when it is impinged by grandparent’s power to rear the 
child, by the state’s ability to determine how to educate the child, and by other violations of that 
right. In this sense those claiming that parents have a fundamental right to control their children’s 
upbringing are correct, however, when the rights of children conflict with the parent’s right, the 
court has found it acceptable and even necessary to regulate the upbringing of children.   
 One such case was Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth in 1976, which 
dealt with a minor’s ability to have an abortion without parental consent. The defendants of the 
law, which mandated parental consent for a minor to have an abortion, cited cases such as Meyer 
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters in an effort to argue that parental discretion like that 
provided in the law “has been protected from unwarranted or unreasonable interference from the 
state” (Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, at 72). In this case where the right of the 
minor to make decisions about procreation was violated, the court held that such a law was 
unconstitutional. The court held that “Constitutional rights to not mature and come into being 
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are 
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights” (Planned Parenthood of Central 
Mo. v. Danforth, at 74).  
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 In deciding the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited the distribution 
of contraceptives to children under sixteen years of age, the Supreme Court in Carey v. 
Population Services Int’l held that such a law was unconstitutional based on the same logic as 
court rulings allowing for minors to choose to have an abortion. The court in this opinion stated 
that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone” (Carey v. 
Population Services Int’l, at 692).  
 These cases thus show that the parental claim to have authority to corporally punish 
children based on the Ninth Amendment right to privacy in child rearing is not valid if corporal 
punishment is shown to violate any right of the child. Children are people just as adults and are 
afforded the same constitutional protections. Corporal punishment has been ruled to violate the 
Eighth Amendment for criminals, and adults are protected under charges of assault in New York, 
yet the same actions are sanctioned by the law providing that corporal punishment of minors is a 
justification for physical violence. With children’s rights applicable and the ability for the state 
to intervene in order to protect those rights, it will be determined whether corporal punishment in 
the home violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Eighth Amendment Applicability 
 In 1970, James Ingraham, an eighth grade student in Florida, was subjected to “more 
than 20 licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal’s office” (Ingraham v. 
Wright, at 657). The boy was beaten due to his slow response to the teacher’s instructions and as 
a result of his punishment he suffered from a hematoma that needed medical attention and 
prevented him from attending school for several days (Ingraham v. Wright, at 657). In the same 
year, Roosevelt Andrews, a ninth grade student at the same school, was paddled for small 
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infractions several times at school, twice resulting in the inability for him to fully use his arm for 
a week (Ingraham v. Wright, at 657).  
 These two children filed suit resulting in Ingraham v. Wright, the only United States 
Supreme Court case directly dealing with corporal punishment of minors. The case dealt with the 
constitutionality of corporal punishment in the school and found that no rights of the students 
had been infringed by the punishment. Ingraham v. Wright is the case most similar to any that 
would consider the constitutionality of corporal punishment in the home. Therefore, the Court’s 
opinion will be analyzed in detail. 
 A simple summary of Ingraham v. Wright may cause one to assume that the Supreme 
Court would rule in the same manner regarding domestic corporal punishment as it did regarding 
corporal punishment in the school system. The punishment is essentially the same, made on the 
same class of citizens, however, there are profound differences between the law in question in 
Ingraham v. Wright and New York Penal Code statute § 35.10. 
 Although other reasons, such as the reasonableness and historical tradition of corporal 
punishment in schools were mentioned, the court found that the Eighth Amendment had 
traditionally been associated strictly with the criminal process and therefore the Amendment did 
not apply to school children who were beaten in public schools (Ingraham v. Wright, at 664). 
This interpretation, which was a primary reason that the Court found the student’s rights were 
not violated, came largely from a historical analysis of the Amendment.  
 The first version of a law involving “cruel and unusual punishment” was the English 
Bill of Rights in 1688 (Ingraham v. Wright, at 664) (Trop v. Dulles, at 100). The English version 
was a reaction to the cruelty of English judges and therefore had the intended effect of 
preventing excessively harsh punishments in criminal law. The Court cited the original draft of 
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the law which stated “The requiring excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases and 
imposing excessive fines, and illegal punishments, to be prevented,” although the reference to 
criminal cases specifically was taken out in the final version (Ingraham v. Wright, at 665). The 
court claimed that this omission was “without substantive significance” because the preamble of 
the final draft of the law had a similar reference to criminal cases (Ingraham v. Wright, at 665). 
This final draft of the English Bill of Rights was later used by Virginia for its version of the law 
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. The Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, ratified in 1791, was then taken from the Virginia version (General Interest: Bill of 
Rights) (Ingraham v. Wright, at 664). 
 The Court in Ingraham v. Wright concluded through this historical review that the 
original intent of the law must have been to prevent “cruel and unusual punishment” only when 
dealing with criminals (Ingraham v. Wright). There was, however, a great deal of distance 
between the original draft of the English law and the Eighth Amendment clause which 
diminishes the credibility of this argument. The founding fathers that assembled the Bill of 
Rights did so with over 100 years, a bloody revolution, the Atlantic Ocean, and two versions of 
the law between the Eighth Amendment and the original British draft that included mention of 
criminal cases specifically. The founding fathers created a Bill of Rights that they felt would be 
comprehensive of the most basic and fundamental rights of man which should not be infringed 
by government. To do so, they looked to state declarations of rights in order to determine what 
individual rights needed protection. The Virginia Declaration of Rights had no mention of 
criminal cases specifically, and the drafters of the Bill of Rights looked to the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights in adopting similar wording, they did not look to the first draft of a century 
old British law. If some of those ratifying the Eighth Amendment had known about the genesis 
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of the wording, the majority would have seen the language for what it was: a generic protection 
against “cruel and unusual punishment.” 
 If one looks at the Bill of Rights as a whole, rights pertaining specifically to criminal 
law and procedure were explicitly stated. The Sixth Amendment, which ensures the criminally 
accused will receive a speedy trial by their peers, begins with “In all criminal prosecutions” (U.S. 
Const. amend. VI). The Sixth Amendment demonstrates the Framers were capable of specifying 
the intent of rights restricted to criminal procedure. The fact that no such restriction was written 
into the Eighth Amendment therefore suggests that no intention of the restriction existed. 
(Mortorano, 2014, p. 499).  
 The Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright further admitted that the purpose of the 
Eighth Amendment was different than the original British law that preceded it. The Court found 
that while the British law was developed in order to curtail the cruel punishments of judges 
specifically, the American equivalent, while concerned with restricting judges acting outside 
their legal authority, was primarily concerned with the “legislative definition of crimes and 
punishments” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 665). Thus, the Court accepts that the intent of the 
American version of the wording was different from the British intent. Therefore, it seems 
illogical to assume that the two versions would have the same scope simply due to the 
ambiguous connection between the two laws. Equivalent wording can have very different 
meanings based on the context, and the fact that the Court conceded the intent of the laws was 
different suggests that the Framers version of “cruel and unusual punishment” had no significant 
connection to the original English draft’s meaning in either purpose or scope. It appears more 
likely that the Framers found in the Virginia Declaration of Rights an important protection 
against any “cruel and unusual punishment” by judges, legislatures, or any other authority.  
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 Four justices on the Court dissented in Ingraham v. Wright, three of whom agreed in 
that contrary to the majority opinion, “The Eighth Amendment places a flat prohibition against 
the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 684). The justices felt 
that the protection from “cruel and unusual punishment” reflects “a societal judgment that there 
are some punishments that are so barbaric and inhumane that we will not permit them to be 
imposed on anyone, no matter how opprobrious the offense” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 684). This 
interpretation stems from the wording of the text and is far more likely to be the original 
interpretation of the Amendment as well. The above statement is one that few Americans would 
disagree with, and one that many would support, for it appears accurate both legally and morally. 
The dissenting justices then continued, stating “If there are some punishments that are so 
barbaric that they may not be imposed for the commission of crimes, designated by our social 
system as the most thoroughly reprehensible acts an individual can commit, a fortiori, similar 
punishments may not be imposed on persons for less culpable acts” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 
684). This argument makes great sense. Corporal punishment against prisoners and criminals has 
been banned, and yet small children who may displease their parents through the most miniscule 
action are not protected against the very same punishment. 
 The majority in Ingraham v. Wright also justify the restricted scope of the Eighth 
Amendment based on court precedent, claiming that every Court decision involving protection of 
the Amendment has dealt with criminal punishment (Ingraham v. Wright, at 666). The fact that 
protecting citizens from “cruel and unusual punishment” involving criminal punishment is the 
primary purpose of the Eighth Amendment is not under attack. It makes perfect sense that all 
Court decisions involving the Amendment’s application have been concerned with the primary 
purpose of the Amendment. The fact that other arenas for protection have not been upheld by the 
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Court may be due to the fact that few have found their right against “cruel and unusual 
punishment” infringed except in the criminal realm. The dissenting justices in Ingraham v. 
Wright explained this reality, arguing that Eighth Amendment cases exclusively dealing with 
criminal punishment was because “We are fortunate that in our society punishments that are 
severe enough to raise a doubt as to their constitutional validity are ordinarily not imposed 
without first affording the accused the full panoply of procedural safeguards provided by the 
criminal process” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 686). This, and not the distinction between criminal 
and noncriminal punishment is the reason that every Eighth Amendment case has dealt with 
criminal punishment (Ingraham v. Wright, at 684).   
 The Supreme Court has held the Eighth Amendment must “draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Trop v. Dulles, at 
101). The result of this interpretation is an ever changing meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 
While each Court decision upholding Eighth Amendment protection has in some manner 
involved criminal statutes or prosecution, more recent Court decisions have expanded on this 
category (Mortorano, 2014). The decision in Trop v. Dulles, for example, dealt with a passport 
application that was denied due to petitioners lost citizenship after having received a 
dishonorable discharge for desertion. The Court found that such a result of dishonorable 
discharge was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment (Trop v. Dulles). This case has 
been considered important due to its extension of the Eighth Amendment “beyond the confines 
of the penitentiary” (qtd. in Mortorano, 2014, p. 499). In Estelle v. Gamble the Supreme Court 
expanded the Eighth Amendment to include for the first time prisoner medical care, an issue that 
cannot be directly considered dealing with penal law and the punishment of the criminally 
convicted (Mortorano, 2014, p. 499). Thus, modern issues have begun to move the Court away 
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from the primary purpose of the Eighth Amendment to other segments of life and society, 
demonstrating the general language of the text in effect.        
 The fact that the United States Supreme Court restricted the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment is very interesting in another light. Throughout history the Court has tended to 
expand or at least leave ambiguous the scope of fundamental rights. Such a clear restriction of a 
right suggests there may have been a concealed motive in so doing. At the time, corporal 
punishment was a disciplinary method used far more frequently than today. The negative side 
effects were also unknown. The justices of the Court may have felt a need to protect what they 
felt was a longstanding American tradition. The fact that they chose to protect corporal 
punishment through restricting the scope of the Eighth Amendment suggests that this was the 
only option these justices had. In light of court precedent, as will be discussed later in this paper, 
the justices may have realized that were the scope of the Eighth Amendment to apply to children, 
corporal punishment would surely violate the protection of the Amendment. With a compelling 
argument made that the precedent set by Ingraham v. Wright should be overturned and the scope 
of the Eighth Amendment recognized today as inclusive of any “cruel and unusual punishment,” 
it will now be discussed whether the New York State law sanctioning parental corporal 
punishment of minors violates the Amendment despite a restricted scope. 
 As previously provided, the New York statute permitting corporal punishment states, 
“The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is 
justifiable and not criminal under any of  the following circumstances: 1. A parent, guardian or 
other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one or 
an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a 
person under the age of twenty-one for a special purpose, may use physical force, but not deadly 
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physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary 
to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person” (§ 35.10). The Supreme Court in 
Ingraham v. Wright found that the Eighth Amendment applied to the criminal process, and that 
the Eighth Amendment was created specifically to deal with “those entrusted with the criminal-
law function of government” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 664). New York statute § 35.10 exists in 
the state Penal Code. As a criminal-law which applies to the criminal process, the law exists 
within the applicable scope of the Eighth Amendment. Anyone affected by this law is therefore 
subject to the protection of the Amendment. 
 The New York law excludes as an offense the use of physical force by a parent or legal 
guardian on a person under the age of twenty-one in the care of the adult as long as the physical 
force is seen as the adult to be necessary to “maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of 
such person” (§ 35.10). The ramifications of this law are twofold. First, the parent or legal 
guardian is able to use physical force without it constituting a criminal offense. The second 
ramification, however, is that in allowing for the parent to use physical force against the child, 
the state sanctions the physical punishment of a minor who has been found to have committed an 
offense through the reasoning of the parent. This law provides a parent or legal guardian the 
authority to determine what constitutes a criminal offense of the minor, the guilt of the minor, 
and the necessary punishment of the minor. The statute thus clearly sanctions physical 
punishment as an acceptable punishment for a minor who has been criminally convicted by the 
parent. Such a statute effects the criminal punishment of a minor and is within the scope of 
Eighth Amendment protection as determined by the Court in Ingraham v. Wright. This alone 
does not automatically call for the unconstitutionality of New York statute § 35.10, rather this 
conclusion simply permits for the Eighth Amendment to be an applicable protection. We must 
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now move to determine if parental corporal punishment of a minor violates the Eighth 
Amendment.           
Ingraham v. Wright Eighth Amendment Scope Interpretation 
 The United States Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright claimed that “In addressing 
the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, this Court 
has found it useful to refer to ‘traditional common-law concepts,’ and to the ‘attitudes which our 
society has traditionally taken’” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 659). From this writing, one would 
assume that the interpretation of what violates the Eighth Amendment depends in large part on 
the punishment that has traditionally been allowed by our society. The Supreme Court, 
predictably, then demonstrated later in the opinion that corporal punishment has been an 
accepted punishment that has not been considered “cruel or unusual.” A reading of this text 
might suggest that corporal punishment of children in the home would similarly not qualify as 
cruel and unusual punishment, however, let us examine the case cited where the “Court has 
found it useful” to analyze “traditional common-law concepts” and the “attitudes which our 
society has traditionally taken” (Ingraham v. Wright, at 659). The case that the Court referred to 
was Powell v. Texas in 1968.  
 The appellant in Powell v. Texas had been arrested and charged with public 
intoxication. The appellant claimed that the law stating “whoever shall get drunk or be found in a 
state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined 
not exceeding one hundred dollars” violated the Eighth Amendment because the appellant was 
“afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism” and therefore the appellant had no control over 
his intoxication (Powell v. Texas, at 517). Thus, the case certainly involved Eighth Amendment 
claims; however, an analysis of the context from which the quotations were taken suggests that 
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the court did not simply use traditional precedent in interpreting the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 The argument of the appellant was supported by the 1962 Supreme Court decision in 
Robinson v. California which found that a law making it a crime to be addicted to narcotics was 
unconstitutional and in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Powell v. Texas, at 532). The main 
reason that the Court in Powell did not agree with the logic of the appellant was a distinction 
made between the two laws. The unconstitutional law made the addiction itself to be a crime, 
while the law under analysis in Powell made the action of intoxication a crime (Powell v. Texas, 
at 532). This was the primary reason for the Court’s reasoning in Powell, not the traditional 
acceptance of intoxication as a crime. 
 In Ingraham v. Wright the Court implied that “traditional common-law concepts” 
(Powell v. Texas, at 517) had been used in the past to determine the proper scope of the Eighth 
Amendment, however, the meaning of this quotation changes when the surrounding context is 
included. The larger quotation reads, “Traditional common-law concepts of personal 
accountability and essential considerations of federalism lead us to disagree with appellant. We 
are unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge, 
that chronic alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an irresistible 
compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their 
performance of either or both of these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from public 
intoxication” (Powell v. Texas, at 535). The case may involve the Eighth Amendment yet this 
quotation is a response to the debate between the appellant and defendant as to whether 
alcoholics can control their actions, whether they should be held personally accountable for their 
actions, and whether the law criminalizing public intoxication is able to create a deterrent against 
Junquera 24 
intoxication for alcoholics. The Court considered, among other factors, the traditional common-
law doctrine of personal accountability. This quotation was related to a much different question 
than the protection of the Eighth Amendment. 
 Similarly, the second quote from Powell that was used as evidence for a traditionalist 
look at the Eighth Amendment in Ingraham was taken out of context. The larger section reads, 
“The fact that a high percentage of American alcoholics conceal their drinking problems, not 
merely by avoiding public displays of intoxication but also by shunning all forms of treatment, is 
indicative that some powerful deterrent operates to inhibit the public revelation of the existence 
of alcoholism. Quite probably this deterrent effect can be largely attributed to the harsh moral 
attitude which our society has traditionally taken toward intoxication and the shame which we 
have associated with alcoholism” (Powell v. Texas, at 531). Here the Court was attempting to 
understand what caused alcoholics to conceal their problems, suggesting that the cause might be 
“the harsh moral attitude which our society has traditionally taken toward intoxication” (Powell 
v. Texas, at 535). Clearly the Court in Ingraham took these quotations out of context in order to 
defend the procedure it used for determining the scope of the Eighth Amendment. The fact that 
the Court could find no more relevant past Court statements that suggested the Eighth 
Amendment should be interpreted to protect only punishments that have not traditionally been 
imposed is very revealing. The Eighth Amendment meaning as used by other Supreme Court 
decisions will now be analyzed. 
Evolving Eighth Amendment Interpretation 
 It was almost eighty years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights before the United 
States Supreme Court ruled on a case regarding “cruel and unusual punishment” (Furman v. 
Georgia, at 264). Early cases did little to determine a specific definition of what crimes 
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constituted “cruel and unusual punishment,” rather the Court tended to determine the scope of 
the clause by “looking backwards for examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause” 
(Weems v. United States, at 377). For example, the Court concluded in Wilkerson v. Utah in 
1879 that punishments of torture such as emboweling alive, beheading, drawing and quartering, 
publicly dissecting, and burning alive, were all prohibited by the Eighth Amendment (Furman v. 
Georgia, at 264). Punishment that was “cruel and unusual” was found to consist of something 
more than death alone, the punishment had to involve “torture or a lingering death” and the 
clause was read to imply that something “inhuman and barbarous…more than the mere 
extinguishment of life” was necessary in order to be unconstitutional (qtd. Furman v. Georgia, at 
265). During this period of Eighth Amendment interpretation, little more than torture or horrible 
atrocities were found to constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” since only those punishments 
that were considered “cruel and unusual” at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted were found 
unconstitutional (Furman v. Georgia, at 264).  
 This notion proved to be a challenge for practical applicability of the Eighth 
Amendment to ordinary American life due to the high torture threshold that a punishment must 
surpass for Americans in the founding period to have considered it “cruel and unusual.” The 
clause, as has been mentioned, was taken from the English law that intended on restricting the 
authority of English judges in the wake of atrocities committed upon English citizens. Early 
Supreme Court rulings appear to have done little more than reinforce that crimes of the horrible 
level committed by the English were also unconstitutional in the United States.  
 The argument has been made that the Framers wanted “cruel and unusual punishment” 
prohibited after seeing the potential usefulness of the Virginian Declaration of Rights, not the 
importance of the British law and what the British law specifically protected. The Court in 
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Weems v. United States in 1910 came to a similar conclusion. The Court in this decision noted 
that one delegate at the Pennsylvania Convention felt the Eighth Amendment was unnecessary 
because, while “The doctrine and practice of a declaration of rights have been borrowed from the 
conduct of the people of England on some remarkable occasions…the principles and maxims on 
which their government is constituted are widely different from those of ours” (Weems v. United 
States, at 372). The delegate, Mr. Wilson, was referring to the difference between the British 
monarchy, and the American democracy that would in turn prevent the legislatures from ever 
allowing “cruel and unusual punishment” in the kind that was seen by the British. This was 
surely a valid argument. Justice Story in his work on the Constitution came to the conclusion that 
the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause “would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free 
government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should 
authorize or justify such atrocious conduct” (Weems v. United States, at 371). For this reason the 
Court in Weems v. United States realized that had the original Amendment interpretation been 
sustained, it would have been unnecessary due to the inherent checks and balances in 
representative government and thus the Eighth Amendment “would have effectively been read 
out of the Bill of Rights” (Furman v. Georgia, at 265). 
 The Court in Weems, faced with this alternative, determined that the Founders 
“intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the 
Stuarts,” claiming that the Founders “jealousy of power had a saner justification than that” 
(Weems v. United States, at 372). The Framers must therefore have placed the clause in the Bill 
of Rights knowing that “With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal 
character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with what 
accompaniments they might...that power might be tempted to cruelty” (Weems v. United States, 
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at 372). The Court in Weems determined that this was the danger from which the Founders hoped 
to prevent through the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, 
the Court wrote that “This was the motive of the clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent 
providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like 
the Stuarts, or to prevent only an exact repetition of history” (Weems v. United States, at 373).  
 The Court in Weems v. United States forever changed the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment so that, contrary to the interpretation used by the Court in Ingraham based on 
history and precedent, the Amendment would not be limited to traditional custom. The Court 
expressed this concept, writing, “Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is 
true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily 
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence 
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider 
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They 
are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, ‘designed to approach immortality as nearly as 
human institutions can approach it.’ The future is their care and provision for events of good and 
bad tendencies of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, 
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be” (Weems v. United 
States, at 373). This principle applies to the Constitution in general, but specifically it applies to 
the Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual” clause. Each United States Supreme Court decision 
following Weems, aside from Ingraham, has not limited punishments considered “cruel and 
unusual” to those considered so in the past, rather the Court has held the clause to hold an 
indefinite and evolving nature.  
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 As mentioned previously, the Court in Trop v. Dulles in 1958 upheld this interpretation 
of the Eighth Amendment in Weems, stating that “the words of the Amendment are not precise, 
and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Trop v. Dulles, at 101). 
Aside from Ingraham, the Court seems hard pressed to write an opinion regarding the Eighth 
Amendment that does not include this quotation after Trop v. Dulles. The Court in Trop also 
acknowledged that the Amendment upholds a basic principle that is “nothing less than the 
dignity of man” and that the Amendment ensures punishment will be “exercised within the limits 
of civilized standards” (Trop v. Dulles, at 100).  
 In Furman v. Georgia, a 1972 case regarding the death penalty, Justice Brennan writing 
a plurality opinion reiterated the Eighth Amendment principle explained in Trop, writing that 
“The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as 
human beings” and that a punishment was regarded as “cruel and unusual” if “it does not 
comport with human dignity” (Furman v. Georgia, at 270). Parental corporal punishment will 
now be analyzed in terms of “evolving standards of decency” and a modern understanding of the 
“intrinsic worth” of children (Trop v. Dulles, at 101) (Furman v. Georgia, at 270). 
Historic Usage 
 One factor consistently used in the determination of what constitutes “cruel and 
unusual punishment” has been the “historic usage of the punishment” (Furman v. Georgia, at 
278). There can be no denial that corporal punishment is a longstanding custom, however, the 
fact that corporal punishment has been used for centuries, dating back to the Babylonians, 
ancient Hebrews, ancient Greece, and the Roman Empire may be more of a weakness than 
strength in the custom’s defense (Edwards, 1996, p. 986). Corporal punishment is an ancient 
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practice with ties to ancient civilizations. The fact that corporal punishment still exists is not a 
testament to its effectiveness, it is a testament to the fact that those who believe in its 
effectiveness use arguments and “proof” developed in ancient civilizations which no longer 
complies with modern standards of human decency or modern science.  
 Corporal punishment shared its genesis in ancient culture with many other forms of 
punishment long cast aside as foolish and indecent by modern standards. As early as these 
ancient civilization, and as late as the 19th century in the United States, children were generally 
considered the property of their parents (Coleman, Dodge, & Cambell, 2010, p. 139). In ancient 
civilizations, as property of the parents, the parents had the right to sell, exchange, and kill their 
children (Edwards, 1996, p. 986).  
 This concept is far too similar to the practice of slavery throughout ancient civilization 
and, until the Civil War ended such a “peculiar institution,” within the United States. Slave 
owners during that time were able to beat their slaves legally. As slavery ended in the United 
States, so did the ability for slave owners to corporally punish their slaves, yet while children are 
no longer considered property, the cruelty of the ancient tradition continues legally within the 
home. Corporal punishment is a custom that lives from this cruel and different time. Society has 
advanced enormously since that period, yet corporal punishment lingers, maintaining a 
connection to that past from which no one would argue was reasonable. Society must cut the last 
ties to any thought of one person belonging as property to another. 
 Women shared a similar misfortune to children throughout ancient civilization. The 
concept of treating women as a separate species from men, without the same feelings and 
capacity for suffering possessed by men, became dominant in the middle ages where a man was 
permitted to “castigate his wife and beat her for correction” (History of Battered Women’s 
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Movement). Early American settlers based their law regarding women in English common-law 
which allowed men to beat their wives “for correctional purposes” (History of Battered 
Women’s Movement). Yet over time women began to gain greater rights as individuals. North 
Carolina in 1890 criminalized any form of domestic assault between spouses, and in 1894 the 
same was done in the Mississippi courts (History of Battered Women’s Movement). Children, 
however, made no such progress with their rights as human beings. Very similar arguments were 
made for the acceptability of spousal corporal punishment as parental corporal punishment, 
including the right to familial privacy, which no longer accepted as justification for spousal 
abuse, continues to play a role in the legality of parental corporal punishment.  
 The result of the historic treatment of children is that “a very large percentage of 
children born prior to the eighteenth century were what we would today term battered children, 
and received regular beatings, both at home and school” (Edwards, 1996, p. 987). Many in 
America have used corporal punishment due to passages in religious texts tolerating and even 
promoting the practice. Many Christians were taught to believe that “children were inherently 
evil and that beating was an effective method of driving the devil from them” (Edwards, 1996, p. 
987). Such a concept developed the often quoted lesson from the Bible, “Spare the rod and spoil 
the child,” although this phrase cannot actually be found in the Bible itself (qtd. Edwards, 1996, 
p. 987). The Bible shares its origin with the many ancient civilizations that permitted corporal 
punishment, believing, as did those throughout the Colonial period that corporal punishment was 
a “’desirable and necessary instrument of restraint upon sin and immorality,’ as well as having a 
regenerative effect on the child’s character” (Coleman, Dodge, & Cambell, 2010, p. 138). Thus, 
the Bible advocated for corporal punishment because it was believed that corporal punishment 
was beneficial for children. This has been the common belief throughout the history of 
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civilization; however, as will be discussed in greater depth, modern science has shown this to be 
far from accurate.   
 In light of the enormous disparity between accepted punishments of ancient 
civilizations through the Colonial era and 19th century America, it is odd that the Court in 
Ingraham, a 1977 case, cited William Blackstone, a Colonial era author on the law regarding 
corporal punishment. As one of the justifications for corporal punishment of students, the Court 
cited Blackstone's Commentaries, in which he wrote that force “necessary to answer the 
purposes for which [the teacher] is employed” was “justifiable or lawful” (Ingraham v. Wright, 
at 661). Blackstone has been considered a very credible commentator on the law throughout 
much of the early history of the United States, however, he wrote on the law at a time when it 
was believed that corporal punishment of children was beneficial to them. Blackstone may be 
credible for many areas of early American law, however, he cannot be considered at all relevant 
in what should constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” in contemporary society which views 
so many aspects of punishment differently from the period of his writing.  
 The Supreme Court as early as 1879 in the case of Wilkerson v. Utah supports the 
claim that Blackstone is an outdated reference when dealing with criminal punishment. 
Blackstone, as summarized by the Court, “admits that in very atrocious crimes other 
circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were sometimes superadded” to the penalty of death 
(Wilkerson v. Utah, at 135). Specific additions to the death penalty included the convicted for 
treason being dragged to the place of execution, or in cases of high treason the convicted was 
emboweled alive, beheaded, and quartered (Wilkerson v. Utah, at 135). Blackstone felt that such 
punishments were legal and allowed by the citizenry through “tacit consent,” yet the Court in 
Wilkerson disagreed, writing in reference to Blackstone that “it is safe to affirm that punishments 
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of torture, such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same 
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution” (Wilkerson v. 
Utah, at 136).       
 Corporal punishment of children has roots back to many ancient civilizations and has 
been transplanted into the U.S. through English common-law and religious teachings. There is no 
dispute that corporal punishment has been a historically accepted punishment, however, corporal 
punishment shares this history with a multitude of other punishments no longer considered 
remotely close to reasonable. Corporal punishment is a link to those punishments and one that 
violates the Eighth Amendment just as the others. In addition, Blackstone’s views and 
description of the legality of punishments are outdated and of little use when determining 
whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” as the Court itself suggested in Wilkerson v. Utah. 
Much has changed since the Colonial period, and corporal punishment, while once common, no 
longer fits into “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” 
(Trop v. Dulles, at 101).  
Corporal Punishment’s Acceptability by Contemporary Society 
 Justice Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, wrote that a 
punishment “must not be unacceptable to contemporary society” due to the fact that “Rejection 
by society…is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with human 
dignity” (Furman v. Georgia).  In dealing with corporal punishment of children in schools, the 
Court in Ingraham noted that only Massachusetts and New Jersey had passed legislation barring 
corporal punishment in public schools (Ingraham v. Wright, at 663). At that time the Court wrote 
that it could “discern no trend toward its elimination,” in reference to corporal punishment, yet 
much has changed in contemporary society since 1977 (Ingraham v. Wright, at 661).  
Junquera 33 
 At this point in 2014 thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have made corporal 
punishment in public schools unlawful (United States of America). Iowa and New Jersey have 
prohibited corporal punishment of students in both public and private schools (United States of 
America). Many of the remaining nineteen states that allow for corporal punishment in their 
schools have left the decision for the school districts, resulting in many local districts within 
these states banning corporal punishment in schools, although no state legislation mandates this 
action. This certainly demonstrates a significant trend toward the elimination of corporal 
punishment in public schools. Corporal punishment of children has a similar effect whether the 
child is hit by a teacher or by a parent; therefore, the reduction in states that allow corporal 
punishment in schools demonstrates a general societal dislike of corporal punishment of 
children. Delaware became the first state to ban parental corporal punishment in 2012 
(Clabough, 2012). The strong but largely unfounded fear that laws preventing parents from using 
physical violence on their children will result in greater governmental interference in family life 
is most likely the reason that more states have not passed similar legislation. Nevertheless, now 
that Delaware has enacted such a law, the idea will surely be considered more seriously in other 
states. Thus, there has been a great trend toward the elimination of legal corporal punishment of 
minors.  
 Moreover, the Court has taken greater steps since 1977 to acknowledge and protect the 
rights of children as they are being increasingly recognized as independent, vulnerable, and 
politically powerless people. For example, the Court has overturned previous harsh penalties that 
treated juvenile offenders of the law equally to adults, and has replaced those practices with 
punishments that afford children greater protection (Mortorano, 2014, p. 508). In Roper v. 
Simmons in 2005, the Court banned all laws that imposed the death penalty on juvenile 
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offenders, overturning previous Court precedent (Mortorano, 2014, p. 509). Mandatory 
imprisonment for life for minors regardless of the crime was also ruled to be “cruel and unusual 
punishment” in the 2012 decision Miller v. Alabama (Mortorano, 2014, p. 509). The Court in 
decisions like New Jersey v. T.L.O. in 1985 offered greater protection of children against 
searches and seizures in schools, and in 2011 the Court decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina 
increased Fifth Amendment rights of children (Mortorano, 2014, p. 509). Thus, the trend of the 
Court when dealing with children has been to realize that children are more vulnerable and 
impulsive when committing crimes; therefore, the punishment cannot be as severe.  
 Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion in Furman also noted that a factor to consider 
in determining whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” is the “existence of punishment in 
jurisdictions other than those before the Court” (Furman v. Georgia, at 278). While in 1977 not a 
single country prohibited parental corporal punishment, the first country to ban corporal 
punishment was Sweden in 1979 (States with Full Abolition). Since that time, thirty-five 
countries have joined Sweden so that by 2013 thirty-six prohibited by law any form of corporal 
punishment of minors (States with Full Abolition). Thus, the trend towards the abolition of 
parental corporal punishment is strong worldwide.  
 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) was adopted in 
1989 (Convention on the Rights of the Child). Article 19 of the Convention reads, “States Parties 
shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect 
the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), 
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.” (Convention on the Rights 
of the Child). The United Nations (U.N.) consists of almost every nation in the world. Of the 
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members of the U.N., only the United States and Somalia did not ratify the UNCRC, with 193 
countries parties to the Convention (Shmueli, 2010, p. 306) (Mortorano, 2014, p. 508). Article 19 
is a major international step in acknowledging the rights of children as independent people whom 
should not be subjected to physical or mental violence. The overwhelming international support 
of the UNCRC demonstrates that throughout the world, corporal punishment is no longer viewed 
as acceptable.  
Proportionality of Corporal Punishment 
 In Weems v. United States when the Supreme Court overturned the historical 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in favor of a more evolving understanding, the Court 
found that punishments that were too severe for the crime committed could be considered “cruel 
and unusual.” The Court thus claimed twelve years of hard labor in a penal institution as a 
minimum sentence for falsifying public records was “cruel and unusual punishment” (Weems v. 
United States). The Court claimed that while other offenses such as the death penalty are in 
themselves more “cruel and unusual,” the punishment related to the crime was not justified. The 
Court wrote that “Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their 
conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the 
American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense” (Weems v. United States, at 367). The 
Court in 1976 affirmed this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, writing in Gregg v. Georgia 
that “the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime” (Gregg v. 
Georgia, at 173). This interpretation further led the Court in Robinson v. California to find that a 
law criminalizing the addiction to narcotics to be “cruel and unusual punishment.” The Court 
demonstrated the point that a minor offense, or something not worthy of consideration as an 
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offense, could not be punished even minimally, stating “To be sure, imprisonment for ninety 
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question 
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual 
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold” (Robinson v. California, at 667). 
 In light of this interpretation, we assess the proportionality of the offenses of children 
which have warranted corporal punishment by the parent. A study of parents who killed their 
children found that forty-one percent defended their actions by claiming that they were only 
trying to discipline the child (Edwards, 1996, p. 994). The offense of the children that warranted 
the beatings included incessant crying, soiled diapers, annoying behaviors, blocking the parent’s 
view of the television, not taking out the trash, and not eating dinner (Edwards, 1996, p. 994). 
While the parents studied took the action too far, the children’s behaviors that initiated a violent 
response by the parent are most likely typical for those who are corporally punished. One could 
easily argue that these offenses of the children are so minor that they deserve no punishment at 
all. In fact, children are young and can hardly be seriously blamed for many of these “offenses.” 
A child playing or wanting attention can hardly be blamed for standing in front of a TV, and a 
baby or toddler hurt or in need is genetically programmed to cry. This is not the fault of the 
child, and no deterrence can prevent this behavior. With the offenses established, let us now 
examine the effect of physical punishment. 
 When Ingraham v. Wright was decided, general knowledge of the physical repercussions 
of corporal punishment was known. The fact that for so minor an offense, a small child may be 
hit so that the child feels physical pain is an argument enough to suggest that the punishment is 
“cruel and unusual.” When the hitting results in bruising or continued pain hours after the 
punishment occurred the punishment is even more egregious, yet such arguments have not 
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worked on the Court in the past when dealing with children. At the time of the Ingraham 
decision the wealth of studies on the effects of corporal punishment were not available. These 
studies suggest that even mild corporal punishment resulting in minimal physical punishment can 
have serious repercussions on the long term mental health of the child. The Court in Weems 
wrote, “There could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain 
or mutilation” (Weems v. United States, at 372). Thus, “severe mental pain may be inherent in 
the infliction of a particular punishment” (Furman v. Georgia, at 271). It is the mental pain that 
places even mild parental corporal punishment, traditionally considered reasonable, under the 
protection against the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause due to its lack of proportion to the 
offense. 
 While essentially no scientific studies have found any benefits to corporal punishment 
aside from higher levels of immediate compliance, many studies have found a strong correlation 
between corporal punishment and decreased mental health of the child (Gershoff, 2002, p. 539) 
(Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 238). Studies have consistently found that the frequency or 
severity of corporal punishment administered against children was correlated with higher levels 
of anxiety, depression, alcohol and drug use, and general psychological maladjustment among 
the children (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 238). This correlation with worse mental health is 
believed to be caused by increased levels of cortisol, the bodily hormone responsible for 
increasing stress (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 239). Impaired mental health does not end with 
childhood, but has been found to continue into adulthood, with greater depressive symptoms of 
adults who were hit as children (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 239). 
 There is great concern among both sides in the corporal punishment debate as to the 
quality of the parent-child relationship. The fear that the relationship will be diminished if the 
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state is allowed to interfere with family life has been a concern for many who support the 
allowance of parental corporal punishment. However, research has shown that parents who 
corporally punish their children actually diminish the quality of their parent-child relationship 
(Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 239). The reason for this outcome is that children are “motivated 
to avoid painful experiences, and if they see their parents as sources of pain (as delivered via 
corporal punishment), they will attempt to avoid their parents, which in turn will erode feelings 
of trust and closeness between parent and child” (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 239). 
 A major result of corporal punishment that has been shown not only to be correlated with 
corporal punishment, but which has been shown to be directly caused by corporal punishment, is 
the increased aggressiveness of children and adults who were corporally punished earlier in life. 
Research has found that people who were hit as children are more likely to hit a dating partner, 
to use verbal and physical aggression in attempting to solve problems with their spouse, and to 
corporally punish their own children (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 239). This aggression is not 
limited to family members or significant others. Surveys have found that children who were hit 
are more likely to commit as juveniles violent crime, property crime, and other delinquent acts 
(Straus, 2001, p. 108). Adults who were corporally punished as children were found to be more 
likely to physically assault a non-family member (Straus, 2001, p. 110). Must of this increased 
aggression is explained by Gershoff in her 2002 meta-analysis of corporal punishment where she 
writes “When parents use physical means of controlling and punishing their children, they 
communicate to their children that aggression is normative, acceptable, and effective,” all beliefs 
that in turn promote the social learning of aggression (Gershoff, 2002, p. 555). Children who are 
corporally punished and in turn comply with the parent’s desires “learn that aggression is an 
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effective way to get others to behave as they want and will be disposed to imitate it” (Gershoff, 
2002, p. 555). 
 Corporal punishment is intertwined with incidents of child abuse as well. Parents in the 
U.S. who abused their children have reported that as many as two thirds of abusive incidents 
began as an attempt “to change children’s behavior or to teach them a lesson” (Gershoff & 
Bitensky, 2007, p. 239). This is supported by an unpublished 1994 study that found forty-one 
percent of parents who killed their children were “only trying to discipline them” (Edwards, 
1996, p. 994). In her 2002 meta-analysis, Gershoff found that in each of ten studies reviewed, a 
parent’s usage of corporal punishment increased the likelihood that the child would be injured 
(Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 241). Children who had been corporally punished were seven 
times more likely to receive more severe violence such as punching, kicking, or hitting with an 
object (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 241). This evidence makes it impossible to conclude that 
corporal punishment can be considered as an entirely different punishment than child abuse, due 
to the high association between the two levels on a continuous line of physical violence. 
 A study with less outside concurrence also found that children who were corporally 
punished were linked to lower levels of occupational success and income (Straus, 2001, p. 144). 
Each of these negative side effects of corporal punishment accumulates so that allowing the 
action is no longer allowing just physical pain for small offenses. A law sanctioning corporal 
punishment allows a punishment which leads to much more. Corporal punishment leads to 
lifelong depression, anxiety, high levels of stress, greater risk of criminal offenses later in life, a 
less loving and trusting relationship with parents, and perhaps even less occupational and income 
success. The cumulative effect of this evidence makes corporal punishment far from proportional 
to the small crimes for which children are punished. Ingraham v. Wright was made without 
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knowledge of these side effects; therefore, a new decision overturning the past in light of new 
scientific knowledge is warranted.  
Is Corporal Punishment Necessary? 
 In determining whether a punishment was “cruel and unusual” the Court in Gregg v. 
Georgia wrote that “the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain” (Gregg v. Georgia, at 173). In order to determine whether a punishment is unnecessary, the 
effects of the punishment must be compared to the purpose by which the punishment is imposed. 
Parents use corporal punishment as a disciplinary method in order to “reduce undesirable child 
behavior in the present and to increase desirable child behavior in the future” (Gershoff & 
Bitensky, 2007, p. 233).  
 The effectiveness of corporal punishment on immediate behavior changes has shown 
mixed results depending on the study (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 233). In the introduction to 
this paper, a case was cited involving the corporal punishment of a twelve year old boy named 
G.F. The boy was paddled thirty-six times by his father for leaving the house without permission 
(In Re: The Welfare of the Children of N.F. and S.F.). Nevertheless, after his punishment G.F. 
did not submit to his parent’s will and say in his room, instead he almost immediately engaged in 
the action for which he was punished and left his room (In Re: The Welfare of the Children of 
N.F. and S.F.). In this incident corporal punishment was not at all effective in achieving 
immediate compliance, and unlike historical belief that corporal punishment is the best and most 
effective means of discipline, it has been found to be no more effective than other punishments 
which carry less risk (Pollard, 2002, p. 449). Studies have shown that setting clear standards for 
what is expected, providing lots of love and affection, explaining to the child why certain 
behavior is not acceptable, and recognizing and rewarding good behavior are all effective 
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alternatives to corporal punishment (Straus, 2001, p. 150). If a simple “time out” or reasoning 
with the child is as effective as using physical violence that carries with it a risk of many 
negative side effects, corporal punishment can only be seen as “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain” (Straus, 2001. P. 150) (Gregg v. Georgia, at 173).  
 While the effectiveness of corporal punishment in regards to immediate compliance is 
scientifically debatable, the effectiveness of corporal punishment in regards to long term 
behavior is not. Gershoff’s 2002 meta-analysis found that corporal punishment was associated 
with less moral internalization and long-term compliance (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007, p. 234). 
Corporal punishment causes the victim to feel that socially acceptable behavior is only necessary 
when they are being watched. Corporal punishment has not been found to promote children’s 
independent choice to act in a proper manner solely because it is the right choice. Therefore, 
corporal punishment achieves none of the goals of parents who utilize it as a disciplinary 
method; rather corporal punishment in many ways inhibits the achievement of the goal. To use 
corporal punishment despite this evidence is “cruel and unusual.”   
Conclusion 
 This paper has reviewed the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment as it evolved over time. Major Court rulings have been investigated to determine 
whether the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause prohibits parental corporal punishment. The interpretation of the clause’s meaning, which 
is based on evolving standards of decency, necessitates the examination of several factors 
regarding corporal punishment. The historical acceptance of the punishment, the contemporary 
acceptance including acceptance in other jurisdictions, the physical and mental pain suffered, the 
proportionality of the offense compared to the punishment, and the necessity of corporal 
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punishment in the achievement of its purpose have each been examined. This analysis of 
corporal punishment in light of contemporary scientific understandings of corporal punishment’s 
effectiveness and side effects has resulted in a conclusion that parental corporal punishment, as 
permitted in the New York State Penal Code, is unconstitutional. Throughout the history of 
civilization children have had minimal legal protection and have been subjected to “cruel and 
unusual punishment.” Yet as society matures and progresses it has increasingly devoted the 
protection of the rights of youth, as children are viewed as excessively vulnerable individuals in 
need of legal assistance in their proper care and upbringing. This developing principle has been 
accepted both in the United States and worldwide as seen in the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. Yet in the face of progress corporal punishment is a link to a dark past 
where people owned people and only a portion of society was afforded the protection of the law.  
 While this thesis has focused on the Eighth Amendment specifically, corporal 
punishment may violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause. Further research could enhance the discussion 
around corporal punishment in regards to those amendments. A tradition as firmly entrenched as 
corporal punishment will not be defeated without overcoming significant opposition, yet this 
thesis demonstrates that both the law and science are tools rather than obstacles for reform. This 
thesis has laid the ground work for legal arguments in both the courtroom, and moral arguments 
in the legislature. The work now remains to advocate on behalf of children in these arenas and 
the public so that children can be free from state sanctioned “cruel and unusual punishment.” 
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